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 Decentralized Tax and Public Service Policies  






A central focus of an extensive literature on fiscal competition has been on how the 
decentralization of tax and service policy affects efficiency, generally whether public 
services are inefficiently under- or overprovided. This question has traditionally been 
addressed in a framework in which the tax base regions compete for mobile capital.  
 
Here I am also interested in the impact of fiscal decentralization on both public service 
provision and tax policy but in a framework with both labor and capital mobility. Rather 
than limiting the competing regions to taxing only capital or only labor, I consider the 
endogenous choice of the two tax instruments in the context of two related models.  In 
the first model, while labor is mobile it is also homogeneous.  In this model I show that 
regions will choose to only tax income and not capital when public service costs are 
proportionate to the population and, by doing so, will provide the efficient level of public 
services.  However, if there are public service costs not proportionate to the population, 
“fixed costs,” if given the option, regions will tax or subsidize capital as well as tax 
income.  As a result of capital taxation, the public service is underprovided. 
 
I extend the model along the lines of Wildasin (AER, 2000) to consider two groups of 
workers who differ in both mobility and, in my case, human capital (skill). Unlike Wil-
dasin, the difference in income is exogenous and not the result of investment decisions.  
In this model, I first consider the policies chosen by these regions when they can only tax 
income.  I find that the public service can be either over or underprovided, depending on 
the relative impact of changes in public services and taxes on the mobility of the two 
groups.  Next, I consider whether, in the absence of fixed costs, regions will want to tax 
or subsidize capital and find that in general they will with the magnitude and sign of a tax 
(subsidy) on capital depending on how capital taxation affects the relative mobility of the 
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*Corresponding author   In what has become an extensive literature, most research in the field of fiscal competition 
has focused, explicitly or implicitly, on competition between jurisdictions for physical or, perhaps, 
financial capital. Most of these studies assume a very general notion of capital probably most con-
sistent with the phenomenon of business owners deciding in which jurisdiction they should locate a 
plant or operation. Given the focus on the location of plants and physical capital, the literature on 
fiscal competition has primarily focused on how this competition influences the decisions of govern-
ments on taxes imposed on businesses, particularly taxes on physical capital such as property taxes, 
and government services that are used as inputs in production. That labor is typically assumed im-
mobile in these studies of fiscal competition, is more evidence of the focus of this research on 
physical capital.  
  While there is certainly evidence, both anecdotal and from rigorous empirical studies, that 
local, regional, and frequently even national governments compete for physical capital and invest-
ment using both tax and service instruments, here we intend to consider competition for another 
form of capital, human capital. In contrast to the traditional framework (for example, Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986)), we assume both labor and capital are mobile among 
regions. While Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), Keen and Marchand (1997), and Huber (1999) consi-
der the models in which labor supply is explicitly modeled and taxed, these models assume labor is 
immobile with only capital being mobile. In contrast to our model, however, in these models labor 
supply (for an individual) is elastic.  
  While studies including Hoyt (1991, 1992a 1992b), Wilson (1995), and Brueckner (2000) 
have mobile labor, our framework differs from those found in these papers in several respects. 
Though labor is mobile in the papers by Hoyt and Wilson, all individuals are identical and the focus 
is still on the tax on capital, that is, a property tax. While Brueckner (1999) has heterogeneity, again 
the focus is on capital taxation.    With the exception of the few studies noted above, most studies of decentralized taxation of 
human or physical capital assume an exogenously determined tax base.  Here, however, I consider 
the endogenous determination of both tax rates and tax bases when both capital and labor are 
mobile.  While in the United States, the primary source of tax revenue for local governments is the 
property tax, a tax primarily on capital; this is not the case for state governments.  As can be seen in 
Table 1, in 2007 local governments collected 76.2 percent of their revenues from the property tax, 
another 1.3 percent from the corporate net income tax and only 3.9 percent from individual income 
taxes.  In contrast, state governments collected 35.8 percent of their taxes from the individual 
income tax and only 1.6 percent and 6.8 percent from the property and corporate net income taxes. 




   State and Local  Local  State 
Total   1,270,640  %  511,429 %  759,211 % 
Individual Income  291,405 22.9 19,985 3.9 271,420 35.8 
Corporate Net Income  58,351 4.6 6,844 1.3 51,507 6.8 
Property 401,896  31.6 389,573 76.2 12,323 1.6 
General Sales  305,009  24.0 64,317 12.6 240,692 31.7 
Select Sales  60,586  4.8 1,684 0.3 58,902 7.8 
Motor Vehicle  23,231  1.8 1,412 0.3 21,819 2.9 
All Other  130,162  10.2 27,614 5.4 102,548 13.5 
Amounts are in $1,000,000.  Source:  Quarterly Summary of State and Local 
Government Tax Revenue (http://www.census.gov/govs/www/qtax.html) 
 
  I examine this mix of taxation on human capital (income taxation) and physical capital (pro-
perty taxation) using two distinct frameworks.  First, I consider a model with homogeneous, but im-
perfectly mobile, labor.  I model imperfect or costly mobility using the concept of attachment to 
home following the approach used by Myers (1990) in which there is a distribution of this attach-
ment to home among the population. Using this framework, I consider the mix and level of taxation 
and public service chosen by a welfare-maximizing regional government when public service costs 
are strictly proportionate to the population.  I then examine the region’s policy choices when ser-
vices exhibit a “fixed” cost, thereby making costs no longer proportionate to the population. 
  2  With this simple framework, I find that when public service costs are strictly proportionate 
to the population, regions will independently choose to only tax income and will provide an efficient 
level of public services.  However, when costs are not strictly proportionate to the population, if 
allowed, regions will choose to tax or, subsidize, capital as well as tax labor. Whether and how much 
capital is taxed or subsidized depends on whether capital and labor are substitutes or complements 
in production and the extent of interregional mobility of labor. As a consequence of this capital taxa-
tion, regions will underprovide public services regardless of whether capital is taxed or subsidized.  
If regions do not have the option to tax capital and can only tax income, the public service is effi-
ciently provided -- even with the existence of fixed costs. 
  Next I allow for the possibility of heterogeneous workers, specifically two groups of wor-
kers, skilled and unskilled, that differ in earnings (wages), tastes for the public service, and interre-
gional mobility.   Unlike Wildasin (2000) the distinction between skilled and unskilled is not endo-
genous, that is, a choice of workers but instead it is exogenously determined.  The analysis is done 
for arbitrary degrees of mobility for the two groups, with the possibility that skilled workers are 
more or less mobile than unskilled workers.  However, evidence on the relationship between educa-
tional achievement or skill and geographical mobility suggests that in the U.S. households with 
higher levels of education tend to be more mobile. In the case of mobile skilled workers, the focus 
of policy might be the impacts of taxation on the residential location of the highly-skilled; in the case 
of mobile unskilled workers, redistributive policies that may influence the location of lower skilled 
workers are the policy focus.  Here, I first examine income tax policies when regions are faced with 
heterogeneous workers with differing degrees of mobility.  My focus is on how this differential 
mobility of workers, along with different tastes for the public service, and different taxable earnings 
influences the level of the public service the welfare-maximizing regions will provide. When 
restricted to the income tax, I find that regional governments may either underprovide or 
  3overprovide public services.  With an income tax, skilled workers generate a “fiscal surplus,” that is 
the revenue collected from them exceeds the cost of providing public services to them while 
unskilled workers generate a “fiscal deficit.” Because of the fiscal surpluses and deficits associated 
with the two types of workers, regional governments have incentives to attract skilled workers to 
their region and deter the entry of unskilled workers.  Then whether public services are below or 
above the efficient level of provision depends on the relatively mobility of the two groups of 
workers and, more importantly, on the relative influence of changes in income tax rates and public 
services on the mobility of both groups. 
  Given that the policies of these regional governments will not, in general, result in the effi-
cient provision of public services, I then consider whether, if given the option, regions will choose 
to tax or, possibly, subsidize capital.  I find that, in general, this will be the case with one of two con-
ditions necessary for a region to choose to employ a nonzero tax (subsidy) on capital: the marginal 
cost of public funds not equaling one when the region only employs the income tax or the two 
groups of workers respond differently to a tax on capital.  Whether regions will tax or subsidize capi-
tal depends on the relationships between capital and the two types of labor, specifically whether and 
how strong a substitute or complement with capital each may be.  The other determinant of the level 
and sign of a tax on capital is the relative impact of a tax increase on the number of workers in each 
group in the region.  
  While it may be argued that the findings of models of fiscal competition for physical capital 
apply to the case of mobile human capital as well, there are some important and obvious distinctions 
between the two cases. First, while there are obviously reasons to think that physical capital (i.e. dif-
ferent business and industrial activities) may differ in its mobility, the policy implications of differ-
ential mobility in the case of physical capital are probably of much less interest than they are in the 
case of human capital. Differences in human capital imply differences in income, making competi-
  4tion for human capital relevant for both efficiency and equity reasons. Perhaps the most significant 
difference between the models of capital tax competition and my models of labor tax competition is 
that in traditional models of tax competition flows of capital only affected tax revenues and not pub-
lic service costs. Here income taxation induces flows of labor and both revenues and costs in a 
region are affected. When individuals are identical and public services have constant costs (with re-
spect to the population) and only labor was taxed, migration has no budgetary impacts – revenues 
collected from an individual would equal to the cost of providing services to him or her.  Here, 
either because of fixed costs of the public service or because there are two groups of workers with 
different incomes, labor migration has budgetary impacts when only labor is taxed. It is for this 
reason, that regions have an incentive to tax or subsidize capital as well as labor. 
  In the next section, I examine the policies chosen by regional governments when workers 
are homogenous and mobile.  My primary interest is in considering the choice of taxing capital and 
labor with the objective of determining under what conditions, will regions choose to tax capital as 
well as labor.  As mentioned, as the structure of public service costs are critical to a region’s choice 
of whether or not to tax capital, I consider both the case of public service costs being strictly pro-
portionate to the population and the case in which public services have a cost independent of the  
population. To offer some illustration of the nature and possible magnitude of capital taxation in 
this model, I discuss the results of a simple numerical parameterization of the model. 
 In  Section 3, I extend the model to incorporate two types of labor potentially differing in 
wages, interregional mobility, and taste for the public service.  I first outline and discuss the equili-
brium regional policies when they can only tax income.  In addition to summarizing the theoretical 
results obtain with this model, I again provide a simple numerical parameterization of it that offers 
additional insights.  Next, I consider whether and when, in this model, the regional governments will 
choose to tax or subsidize capital.  Again, I provide and discuss a simple numerical parameterization 
  5of the model.  Finally, section 4 concludes. 
2.  Policies with Homogeneous Workers 
  In this section, I focus on the choice of income and capital taxation when regional govern-
ments are faced with a mobile but homogeneous labor force.  As discussed earlier, I first consider 
the choice of tax and public service policies when public service costs are proportionate to the pop-
ulation and then consider policy choices when public services might exhibit “fixed” costs.  
  The policies of a single region are assumed to be determined independently of and simulta-
neously with the policies of the other regions in the economy. The regional government chooses its 
policies to maximize social welfare subject to its budget constraint. Unlike the central government, 
the regional government’s policies influence wages, population, and profits.  
  This extensive endogeneity complicates the analysis. This being the case I suppress inter-
mediate steps in the derivation of the results and focus on characterizing the policy choices of the 
region in a way that allows for interpretation. Technical proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
2.1 The  Framework 
  I consider a framework in which there are J regions. None of these identical regions are large 
enough to influence the prices of traded commodities or the utility level received by residents of 
other regions. As this is the case we focus on the policy choices of a single region and suppress any 
references to regions and to equilibrium conditions for the entire economy.   
  Workers and capital are used to produce an intermediate good (x) that can be consumed 
directly or be used to produce one unit of the public service (g) per individual. As x is traded its  
price is set to unity and suppressed. Then the production process in the region is described by the 















fjj  with N denoting 
the number of workers and K denoting the amount of capital in the region. As both the labor and 
capital markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, the wage is simply w = fN with the rate of 
  6return on capital denoted by r.  Profits, or the returns to the local factor of production, are  
  () ( ) ( )K r Nw K N f Kf Nf K N f k K N τ π + − − = − − = , ,       (2.1) 
where τk is the (ad-valorem) tax on capital.  Rather than closing the model by distributing profits to  
the workers, I assume they are received by a second group, “landowners” who receives the rent on 
their endowment of capital,  K
J
1
, as well.  
  I examine the use of both the income tax (τ) and capital tax (τk) to finance the government  
 
good (g). Then the government budget constraint is 
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where F is a fixed cost independent of the number of workers in the region.  While this fixed cost is 
independent of both the population and the level of public service, most of the results I obtain 
generalize to a cost function of the form c(n,g) = F(g) + c(n)g with F’>0 and c’ > 0.  I choose the 
simpler cost function for expositional purposes. 
  Utility for the workers is defined by  ( ) g u x U + = .  I assume that individual labor supply is 
exogenously given.  Finally, there are differences among individual workers in the utility they receive 
by residing in this region rather than another region. If individuals are ordered by mobility then we 
can think of utility of individual N as given by 








φ . Then as the number of the group of workers increases, the “attachment to 
home” for the marginal worker diminishes.  Note that if we differentiate (2.3) with respect to the  
 
wage rate (w) and the number of workers (N) we obtain  
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The term γ is simply expressing the mobility of the workers in response to changes in their gross 
wages rates as an elasticity.  
  72.2 Social  Welfare 
  There are two distinct agents in the model to be considered in the social welfare function: 
the “landlords” who receive the residual profits in the region as well as the return to capital and the 
two groups of workers. Here I focus on the “Utilitarian” social welfare function given by 
  () () () K r
J
g NU g g W k k k
1
, , , , , , + + = τ τ τ τ π τ τ    (2.5)  
As consumption of the private good enters into the utility function in a linear fashion, utility can es-
sentially be measured in dollars. In essence, this welfare function is simply measuring total income or 
the income equivalent of all goods in the region.  
2.2  Equilibrium Conditions and Comparative Statics 
  The equilibrium conditions within the region require that the labor markets for both skilled 
and unskilled workers clear, or 
       (2.6a)   () K N f w N , =
and 
  ( K N f r K k , = + ) τ .   (2.6b)  
  In addition, it must be the case that the utility of the marginal worker in the region is equal 
to the utility she could obtain elsewhere. This requires that 
  () ( ) ( ) g u w N + − + τ φ 1  =U      (2.7)  
 
where U  represents the utility obtainable for workers in the other regions.   
  To understand the choice of tax and service policies made by the regional government, I first 
determine how these policies affect migration and wage rates. To do this, the equilibrium conditions 























































= . In (2.8)  ij η  is the price elasticity  
  8of input i with respect to the price of input j.  Using these changes in the wage rates, the impacts of 
the three policies on the number of workers can be obtained.  These are  
() τ η γ
γη
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  Finally, the stock of capital in a region is affected by changes in both wages and the gross 



















































1 ˆ < 0.(2.10) 
2.3 Regional  Policies 
2.3.1  Policies with No Fixed Costs 
  The regional government is assumed to choose its policies to maximize social welfare (2.5) 
subject to the government budget constraint (2.2).  While the objective is the same as the central 
government, unlike the policies of a central government, policy choices of the regional government 
will influence the region’s wage rate, population, and capital stock as described by (2.8) – (2.10).  
This being the case, the first order condition with respect to the income tax rate can be expressed as 
  () ( ) ( ) τ τ τ λτ τ λ N K K w Nw k ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 − − = + −         (2.11a)  
 
with the first order condition with respect to the tax on capital given by 
 
  () ( ) ( )
s s s N K K w Nw K k τ τ τ λτ τ λ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 − − = + − .         (2.11b)  
 
Finally, the first order condition for the public service can be expressed as    
 
         () ( ) ( ) ( ) g g k g N K K w w N MRS N ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 − − − − = − λτ τ λ          (2.11c) 
 
where all three first order conditions were simplified by applying the balanced budget condition.  
 
  I first consider whether the region will use a tax on capital before considering what the opti-
mal rate on it might be. If the region does not tax on capital, then the first order condition for the 
  9income tax, (2.11a), requires λ = 1. With λ = 1 and τk = 0, the first order condition for the tax on 
capital, (2.11b) will be satisfied as well. Finally, in this case the first order condition for the public 
service, (2.11c), reduces to N(MRS – 1) = 0 and the public service is efficiently provided.  These 
results are summarized in a simple proposition: 
Proposition 1:  When the costs associated with providing a public service to a single group of workers are proportionate 
to the number of workers, the use of an income tax on these workers to finance the public service will result in 
the efficient level of public service regardless of the mobility of the group.  Further, the optimal tax rate on 
capital is zero. 
 
  Given that the region had an efficient level of the public service in the absence of capital 
taxation, it is not surprising to that it does not tax capital. With public service costs strictly propor-
tional to the population, the income tax serves two purposes. First, it raises the revenue needed to 
finance the public service. Second, it ensures that the cost of providing the public service to another 
worker is exactly offset by the revenue obtained from the worker. This feature of the income tax dis-
tinguishes it from the tax on capital. Since the cost of the public service is assumed to be unrelated 
to the capital stock in the region, while flows of capital into or out of the region will change tax reve-
nue they do not change public service costs.  
2.3.2  Policies with Fixed Costs of Public Services 
  I now consider the case in which there is a fixed cost of providing the public service. With 
fixed costs, the first order condition with respect to the income tax rate is now 
  () ( ) () ( ) τ τ τ τ τ λ τ λ K K N F K w Nw k k ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 − − = + −        (2.12a)  
 
and with respect to the capital tax rate,  
 
  () ( ) () ( )
k k k K K N F K w Nw K k k τ τ τ τ τ λ τ λ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 − − = + − .        (2.12b)  
 
Finally the first order condition with respect to the public service is 
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) g k g k g K K N F K w w N MRS N ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 τ τ λ τ λ − − + − − = − .       (2.12c) 
 
where I again simplify the first order conditions by applying the balanced budget condition. 
  10  Again, I first consider the case when the regional government only uses income taxation  
making τk = 0 in (2.12a) and (2.12c) with (2.12b) not applying. With τk = 0, the right side of (2.12a) is 
positive. Then for (2.12a) to be satisfied λ > 1.  From (2.8),  =- g w ˆ τ w
w
MRS ˆ . This being the case,  
then any income tax rate and (balanced-budget) level of public service that satisfies (2.12a) also en-
sures that the right side of (2.12c) equals zero, meaning that for (2.12c) to be satisfied, MRS = 1.  
Thus even with the existence of a fixed cost, the public service is efficiently provided if regions only 
use the income tax. 
   Will the region choose to employ any tax on capital? To consider this question, evaluate 
(2.12b) when τk = 0,  
  () ()
k k
k














        (2.13)  
where W
~ refers to the value of the welfare function with optimally chosen income tax and public 
service policies. Recall that λ > 1 when τk = 0 and (2.12a) and (2.12c) are satisfied. Then if capital and 
labor are substitutes ( ) 0 > lk η  the region will impose at least some tax on capital as the tax will in-
crease the wage rate and the population. Since λ > 1 even if increases in τk have no impact on the 
labor market ( ) 0 ˆ , 0 ˆ , 0 = = =
k k N w lk τ τ η  the region will again impose a tax on capital as the benefits of 
the increased revenue, λK, exceed the loss in profits, -K. This leaves the case of when capital and 
labor are complements( ) 0 < lk η . Using (2.12a) I can substitute for the value of λ when τk = 0 in 
(2.13). Making this substitution and substituting for  and  in (2.13) using (2.8) and (2.9) gives 
k wτ ˆ
k Nτ ˆ
  () () () () 0 ) (
~
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As (2.13’) indicates, if the capital and labor are not too strong of complements, labor is relatively  
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may not be positive if the two factors of production 
  11are strong complements, labor is relatively immobile, and wages in the region (Nw) are much greater  
 
than capital costs (K). 
 
 If  (2.13’) is positive, the region will tax capital. It does so in this case and not in the absence 
of fixed costs because the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) exceeds unity when regions only 
use the income tax. The MCPF exceeds unity because an additional cost of the income tax is the 
reduction in population it causes. The region now has an incentive to increase the population to 
“spread” these fixed costs. Then a tax on capital can, by reducing the income tax rate, increase the 
population. If labor and capital are substitutes, a tax on capital increases the population even more 
by increasing the demand for labor. 
  What will the equilibrium tax on capital be? If labor and capital are neither substitutes nor 
complements (ηlk = 0), (2.12) becomes much simpler. With ηlk = 0 we have       =
k wτ ˆ =
k Nτ ˆ = τ K ˆ
0 ˆ = g K . In this case, an obvious choice for τk is to set it so that revenue from tax on capital equals 
the fixed cost of the public service, 
K
F
k = τ . This rate allows the income tax to be set so that reve-
nue per worker equals marginal cost per worker, τw = g. While an intuitively appealing solution, we 
  
can see that in (2.12b)  -- the tax on capital is too high. Then with η
k K K k τ τ ˆ 0 < lk = 0 in equilibrium  
 
the region will set its policies so that τkK < F, τw > g, and g < g
c. These results, specifically the under- 
 
provision of public services, are consistent with the general findings of the tax competition litera-
ture. Here, because to the region the taxation of capital is distorting, the optimal policy is to reduce 
this distortion by adding a distortion in the income tax, specifically setting it so that the revenue per 
worker exceeds the marginal cost of providing the public service to each worker. 
  The general case with ηlk ≠ 0 is more difficult to evaluate. Using the first order conditions for 
the income and capital tax rates, (2.12a) and (2.12b) we obtain the following expression for τk,  









































































   (2.14) 
In (2.14) the numerator and the first term of the denominator are identical. Further, by the second  
 
order conditions we have denominator being positive.  Then from (2.14) if  0 > lk η ,  τk > 0 and if, as 
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>0, then it must be the case that τkK 

















is negative the tax on capital is also negative. This, of course, requires that ηlk < 0. I summarize these 
results in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2:  Assume that the there exists some fixed cost in the production of public services (F). Then: 
a)  In the absence of capital taxation, an income tax on workers, regardless of their mobility, will lead to an 
efficient provision of the public service.   
b)  If the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is greater than zero ( lk η >0) then: 
i)  It will be optimal to impose some positive tax on capital (τk > 0) 
ii)  The level of the tax on capital will be such that the revenues from the capital tax will be less than the fixed 
costs of are less than the fixed cost (τkK < F), income taxes per worker exceed the cost of providing the public 
service to the worker (τw < g), and the level of public service will be less than the efficient level (g < g
c). 














d)  Let the cost function for the public service be of the form c(n,g) = F(g) +c(n)g where F’>0 and F”<0.  Then 
in the absence of capital taxation, an income tax on workers, regardless of their mobility, will lead to an 
efficient provision of the public service.   
 
  Proof of parts a) and d) of the proposition are found in the Appendix.  Part d) is simply a 
generalization of part a) to a broader set of public service cost functions, specifically cost functions 
where the cost of the public service is not strictly proportionate to the population.  As an extreme 
case if the cost function were simply c(n,g) = F(g) and the cost of the public service is independent 
of the number of workers, the result is still obtained.
1
                                                      
1While the optimal regional size with respect to the public service would encompass the entire economy because of 
diminishing returns to labor in the production function, workers will be distributed throughout the regions.  
  13  To provide additional intuition and some concrete examples of how the extent of capital tax-
ation depends on the mobility of labor among regions as well as the elasticities of capital and labor 
in production I provide a few parameterizations of (2.14) in Table 2.  In the table I report capital tax  
 







K k τ  for a variety of values for the elasticity of population with 
respect to the wage () γ , the price elasticity of labor and capital ( ) kk ll and η η , and the cross price  
 
elasticities of labor and capital, ( lk kl ) η η = , which, for the purposes of this example, I assume are 
identical.  I assume that wages are seventy percent of production costs (Nw = .7), capital costs are 
thirty percent (K = .3) and fixed (F) and total marginal costs (Ng) are equal. The income tax rate (τ) 
endogenously determined to ensure a balanced budget.   
  The results of this numerical exercise generally accord with what we might intuitively expect.   
 
For example, looking at row (1) we see that as labor mobility (γ) decreases, the fraction of fixed costs 
covered by capital taxation decreases.  With 
F
K k τ
=.258 as in row (1), column (a) then  ()
F
g w N ) − τ
=  
.742, that is, capital is bearing 25.8 percent of the fixed costs with labor bearing 74.8 percent in  
 
addition to the marginal costs associated with the public service.  As can be seen when comparing 
row (2) where the cross price elasticity between capital and labor, ηkl, is equal to 0.5 and row (3) 
where ηkl = -0.5 to row (1) where ηkl = 0, the share borne by capital increases when capital and labor 
are substitutes and decreases when they are complements with the tax on capital actually being nega- 
tive when ηkl = -0.5.  Again, as we would expect, from inspection of rows (1) and (4), for example, 





increases) the tax burden on capital in-  
creases. Note that only when  5 . 0 , 5 . 1 − = − = kk ll η η , and   5 . 0 = kl η and labor is extremely mobile  
 
(γ=100) (row (8), column (4)) is it the case that the tax revenue collected from capital is close to 
equaling the fixed costs (
F
K k τ
= .966).  
  My results, while consist with those generally found in the tax competition literature, suggest 
that inefficiencies are not inherent to decentralized tax policy formation.  Here, as I show, the pro-
  14blem is related to the choice of instruments the regions used.  If constrained to income taxation, the 
regions will choose tax policies to provide public services efficiently.  However, if allowed to use tax 
capital, these regions use the tax and, as a result, underprovide public services. 
3.  Income and Capital Taxation with Heterogeneous Workers 
  I now consider regional policies when there are two groups of workers, potentially earning 
different wages, having different tastes for the public service, and having different rates of mobility, 
that is, responding differently to changes in regional tax and public service policies.  It is how these 
differences in rates of mobility, combined with differences in earnings and tastes for the public ser-
vice affect regional policies that is the focus of the analysis in this section.  Because many of the re-
sults in the case of fixed costs with homogeneous workers apply here, I only briefly discuss this case 
with heterogeneous workers. 
  The framework is essentially the same as with homogeneous workers with production now 
being characterized by f(N
s,N
u,K) where the superscripts s and u denote skilled and unskilled workers.  
I assume that in equilibrium w
s ≥ w
u.  Profits, then, are given by 
       (3.1)  () K w N w N K N N f Kf f N f N K N N f k




s u s τ π + − − − = − − − = 1 ) , , ( ) , , (




j j , , =
∂
∂
= .  The budget constraint can now be expressed as
  () ( ) ( ) 0 , , = + − + − = K g w N g w N g S k
u u s s
k τ τ τ τ τ .       (3.2) 
  The utility function is the same as with homogeneous worker except that I allow for differ-
ences in tastes between the two types of workers with the utility function for a worker of type k 
given by  () ( )
k k k k N g u x U φ + + =  where  ( )
k k N φ  is the attachment to home for a worker in group 
k.  The elasticity of mobility for a worker in group k,  k γ , is also defined as before.  As with homo-
geneous workers, regional policies are chosen to maximize social welfare where the social welfare 
  15function includes the utility of both groups of workers (skilled and unskilled) and profits, 
  .           (3.3)  ()
u u s s
k U N U N g W + + = π τ τ , ,
3.1  Equilibrium Conditions and Comparative Statics 
  As before, equilibrium requires that labor and capital markets clear in each of the regions, 
  ( ) u s j K N N f w
u s
j
j , , , , = =          (3.4a) 
and 
  ( ) K N N f r
u s
K k , , = +τ .          (3.4b) 
  The marginal worker in each group must receive the same utility as she can obtain elsewhere, 
  ()( ) () u s j U N g u w
j j j j j , , 1 = = + + − φ τ .        (3.5) 
  Not surprisingly, the comparative statics are more complicated than for the case of homoge-
neous workers, primarily because of the possibility that the marginal product for one type of worker 
is dependent on the number of the other type of worker ( ) u s j i f ji , , , 0 = ≠ .  Differentiating the 
equilibrium conditions, (3.4) and (3.5), gives 
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η η η η γ τ      (3.6) 
where  ji η is the elasticity of demand for workers of type j with respect to the wages of workers of 
type i and  A
~
=() us su uu ss η η η η − - u ssν η s u s uu γ γ γ η + −  > 0. 
3.2  Regional Income Tax Policies in the Absence of Capital Taxation 
   I begin by considering the income tax policies chosen by the regions when they cannot tax 
capital. I then consider whether the regions do, in fact, have the incentive to tax capital.  When the 
regions can only tax income, the first order condition with respect to the income tax rate can be ex-
  16pressed as 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
u s s s u u u s s s N N g w N w w N w w N τ τ τ τ τ λ τ τ λ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ 1 1 − − − = + + + −        (3.7a)  
and the first order condition for the public service expressed as    
 
( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
) ( ) ( ) (














u s u u s s N N g w N w w N w w N N N MRS N MRS N − − − − + − − = + − + τ λ τ τ λ . (3.7b) 
 I  obtain  (3.7) by using the budget constraint, (3.2’), to substitute ( ) g w N
s s − − τ  for  ( ) g w N
u u − τ . 
Equation (3.7a) is expressed in a way to highlight the impact of fiscal deficits or surpluses associated 
with the two groups of workers on the marginal cost of public funds (λ). In (3.7b) the first order con-
dition is expressed to contrast it with the condition obtained with a centralized government. Term 
(a), the left side of the equation, is the first order condition for the centralized government. Term (b) 
represents differences due to capitalization and term (c) represents differences due to fiscal surpluses 
or deficits. With equal weights on profits and utility, changes in the gross wage do not affect welfare 
as any increase in utility is offset by a decrease in profits. However, changes in wages that are taxed 
do affect welfare if the marginal cost of public funds (λ) and marginal social welfare (1) are not equal.  
  We gain some insights into the factors that influence the policies set by regions by consi-
dering the case when wages, but not mobility, are equal in the two sectors. In this case neither group 
generates a fiscal surplus or deficit so that τw
s – g = 0 in (3.8) . Therefore the right side of (3.7a) is 
zero and λ = 1 to ensure the left side also equals zero. With λ = 1 and τw
s – g = 0 the right side of 
(3.7b) is zero. Then the left side must also equal zero requiring MRS – 1 = 0.  
  Given that the mobility of a single group of workers had no impact on the provision of the 
public service, it is not surprising that when the wages of the two groups are equal that neither the 
relative nor the absolute mobility of these two groups has any impact on the level of public services. 
While the assumption of equal wages is not, in itself, either realistic and or particularly interesting, it 
suggests why public services set by regional governments may diverge from the levels set by central-
  17ized governments. When the income tax is used and wages are equal neither group generates a fiscal 
surplus or deficit, that is, the revenues obtained from the group of workers equals the costs of pro-
viding the public services to them. In the absence of any surplus or deficit, the government has no 
incentive to alter taxes or public services to either attract surplus-generating workers or deter deficit-
generating workers.  
  More interesting is the case when wages for the two groups are not equal. An increase in 
skilled workers increases in net revenue (τw
s-g>0) while an increase in unskilled workers decreases net 
revenue (τw
u-g<0). Because of the unequal impact on net revenues, the relative mobility of the two 
groups of workers will matter. As inspection of (3.7a) shows, whether the marginal cost of public 
funds is more or less than one (λ >(<) 1) depends on whether the percentage loss in skilled workers 
from a tax increase is more or less than the loss in unskilled workers  ( ) ( )
u s N N τ τ ˆ ˆ > < . The relative mo-
bility of these two groups depends on underlying labor demand and supply conditions, the elasticity 
of the labor supply with respect to income (γs,γu) and the elasticities and cross-price elasticities of 
labor demand (ηuu,ηsu,ηus,ηsu).
2 As extreme cases, if either the supply of unskilled workers in the region 
is inelastic (γu = 0) or their demand is inelastic (ηuu=ηus=ηsu=0) then a larger percentage reduction in 
skilled workers when taxes increase ( ) 0 ˆ ˆ < −
u s N N τ τ  is obtained. We may believe, a priori, that skilled 
workers are more mobile than unskilled workers, γs > γu, in response to changes in their gross wages. 
However, how wages change in response to tax rates depends on both the elasticity and cross-price 
least elasticities of demand for the respective groups making it difficult to surmise anything about 
the relative values of   and  based simply on the relative values of γ
s Nτ ˆ u Nτ ˆ
s and γu. 
  The mobility of the two groups with respect to the public service also affects the choice of 
                                                      
2The relationship between   and   is given by 
s Nτ ˆ u Nτ ˆ
() () () () ( ) ( ) () us su uu ss u s us uu su ss s u
u s A
N N η η η η γ γ η η η η γ γ
τ








1 ~− A where  >  0.  
  18policies.  Again the relative change in the populations of the two groups depends on complicated  
interactions of the elasticities of labor supply and demand for the two groups. In addition, it 








Mobility depends on 
w
MRS  rather than simply the valuation or marginal rate of substitution (MRS) 











τ  is 
proportional to its wage rate.  Given this discussion of the relative mobility of the two groups, we  
 
summarize some results in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. Let  denote the public service level at which  and  denote the 
equilibrium level chosen by the region satisfying (3.7). 
c g
u s u u s s N N MRS N MRS N + = +
* g
 
a) If  w
s = w
u, then λ
*=1 and  . 
c g g =
*
b)   If   then λ 0 ˆ ˆ < =
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< = > ) (   or, equivalently,   




g N N ˆ ) ( ˆ < = >
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  The notation “?” in Proposition 3 refers to an ambiguous sign. Proof of Proposition 3 is found 
in the Appendix. When the skilled and unskilled workers react the same to a change in the tax rate, 
that is,  , the government cannot use the tax rate as a means of changing the mix of skilled  
u s N N τ τ ˆ ˆ =
and unskilled workers. Instead, differences in tastes for the public service must be used to change 
the relative population of the two groups.  At   if 









 then skilled workers place a 
higher value on the public service relative to its tax cost to them than unskilled workers do. This  
 
being the case, balanced-budget increases in the public service will lead to increases in the number of 












= at   the efficient 
c g
  19level of the public service will be provided because   =   and balanced budget changes in the 
public service will not alter the mix of workers. Finally, if 
s










< at   the public service  
c g
will be underprovided since increasing it above   will result in more, not fewer, deficit-generating 
unskilled workers.   
c g
  If skilled workers are more responsive to a tax increase than low-workers ( )
u s N N τ τ ˆ ˆ <  increases  
 
in the tax rate will increase the number of low-skilled workers relative high-skilled workers. For this  
 
reason the marginal cost of funds exceeds unity (λ
*>1). If, at the efficient level of public service, the 

















MRS  the public 
service will be underprovided, thereby reducing the number of unskilled workers. If the public ser- 
 
vice is valued relatively more by skilled workers, the equilibrium level of the public service is ambi-
guous as increases in the public service increase the relative mix of skilled workers but the balanced-
budget increase in the tax rate reduces the mix. Analogously, if the unskilled workers respond more 
to a tax than the skilled workers ( )
u s N N τ τ ˆ ˆ >  then increases in the tax rate reduce the relative number 
of skilled workers. In this case, if the public service is valued more by skilled workers it is unambi-
guously over-provided. If the public service is relatively valued less by the skilled workers, its provi-
sion relative to the efficient level is ambiguous since the impacts of the increases in both the tax rate 
and public service level have different impacts on the relative mix of skilled and unskilled workers. 
  Alternatively, we can add (3.7a) to (3.7b) to obtain the condition, 
( ) () ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () ()
) (
) (
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ










u u u s
g
s s s u s u u s s
N N N N g w N
w w w N w w w N N N MRS N MRS N
− − − − −





  (3.7b’) 
As can be seen in (3.7b’), whether left side is negative or positive and the public service is underpro-
vided or overprovided depends on the two terms on the right side.  The sign of the first term, term 
(a), depends on whether λ is greater or less than one.  If λ > 1, the term is positive; if λ < 1 it is nega-
  20tive. Then from (3.7a), this, in turn, depends on whether high skilled workers are relatively more re-
sponsive to changes in taxes than unskilled workers, that is, whether   .  The sign of the 
second term depends on the relative magnitude of the net impact, , of a balanced-budget 
tax increase on the population of the two groups of workers in the region.  If the net impact on skil-
led workers is less than it is on unskilled workers, 
s Nτ ˆ ≥
u Nτ ˆ
g N N ˆ ˆ − τ





s N N N N τ τ , the term is positive; if 





s N N N N τ τ , the term is negative.  The first term reflects the impact the marginal 
cost of funds (λ) has on the level of the public service the regions will offer.  The higher the marginal 
cost of funds, the higher  and the lower the level of the public service.  The 
second term reflects how net changes in the relative populations of the two groups of workers will 
influence the provision of the public service.  When increases in both the tax and public service lead 
to greater (percentage) losses of skilled workers 
u u s s MRS N MRS N +





s N N N N τ τ  the level of the public 
service is reduced. 
 In  Table 3, I report the results of a simple numerical parameterization of the general equili-
brium outcome with decentralized policy determination when regions can only tax income and have 
heterogeneous workers.  This model is only intended to be illustrative as I did not make any at-
tempts at finding empirically-based values for the parameters. In this simple model, utility for a wor-
ker in group i, i = s, u is U
i = w
i(1-τ) + a
iln(g) +  where I vary the values for a ) (
i i N φ
i and  , the elas-
ticity of mobility.  The parameters were chosen so that for all specifications, the efficient outcome 
has an income tax rate of τ = .1333 and public service level of g = .2.  In equilibrium, the wage of the 
high skilled workers is 2 and that of the low skilled workers is 1 with the equilibrium rate of return 




u = .5) and the equilibrium amount of capital is one in each region. 
  21  In column (a) the taste for the public service is equal for both groups.  However as w
s > w
u, 






< . Then when mobility is equal for the two groups (γ
s = γ
u = 3, column a.1), 














τ  but the impact of a 
















N .  This being the case, the 
public service is underprovided (g = .1972).  When the skilled workers are relatively more mobile  
 
than the unskilled workers (γs
 = 5.5 and γu = 0.5, column a.2) while they are both more responsive to 





























, the  
difference is greater for taxes making it optimal for regions to underprovide the public service. 
When unskilled workers are relatively more mobile (column a.3), the impact of the taxes is still relati-
vely greater for the skilled workers, making it again optimal to underprovide the public service.  
Note that regardless of the specification of tastes and mobility, as expected, the decentralized out-
come results in higher utility for skilled workers and lower utility for unskilled workers than the cen-
tralized outcome though the differences in total social welfare are extremely small.  As suggested by 
our discussion of expression (3.7b’), it is interesting to note that in these numerical examples that if 


















































τ  , whether they are relatively 
more or less responsive to taxes or public services will determine whether the public service is un-















τ then the relative responsiveness of skilled workers to 
taxes exceeds their relative responsiveness to public services and a balanced-budget decrease in taxes  
 
reduces the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers making it optimal for the region to underprovide the 















τ then a balanced-budget increase in taxes reduces the 




3.3  Regional Policies with Capital Income Taxation 
  22  With homogeneous labor and no fixed costs for the public service, the optimal tax on capital 
was zero.  I now examine whether this is the case with heterogeneous workers and no fixed costs.  





























τ τ τ      (3.8)   
  The first order conditions when the region can tax capital are given by (3.9) with (3.9b) being 
the first order condition for the tax on capital.   These conditions are 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ λ τ τ λ K K N g w N N g w N w w N w w N k
u u u s s s u u u s s s ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ 1 1 + − + − − = + + + −    (3.9a)  
with the first order condition with respect to the tax on capital given by 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
k k k k k K K N g w N N g w N K w w N w w N k
u u u s s s u u u s s s
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ λ τ λ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 + − + − − = + + −   (3.9b)  
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λ .   (3.9c) 
  Before trying to characterize the optimal policy, I first consider whether and when a tax on 
capital would be used.  To do this I evaluate the impact of a tax on capital on social welfare when τk 
= 0 and the income tax rate and level of public service are at the socially optimal levels in the 
absence of a tax on capital (τ
*, g
*).  This gives 
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0 − − + + + − =
=    (3.10) 
 





s s + + τ τ τ ˆ ˆ
* > 0 – at the optimal income tax rate (τ
*) the im-
position of a tax on capital will increase tax revenue. Recall that if  we have λ
u s N N τ τ ˆ ˆ =
* = 1 making 
term (a) equal to zero. Sufficient conditions for   to equal zero are or 
u s N N τ τ ˆ ˆ = , , us su uu ss η η η η = =  
and u s γ γ = .  For  we need the additional condition that 
u s
k k N N τ τ ˆ ˆ = uk η  =  sk η .  If this is satisfied, 
  23term (b) and (3.10) equals zero -- there is no gain to the region taxing capital.  If, however, λ
*= 1 but 
sk uk η η ≠ , then a zero tax rate on capital is not optimal.





k N N τ τ ˆ ˆ >
*= 1, (3.10) will be positive.  With skilled labor a stronger substitute for capital, it will be optimal to 




k N N τ τ ˆ ˆ <
* = 
1, capital should be subsidized as skilled labor is a relative complement with it. 
 If  λ
* > 1 ( ) 0 ˆ ˆ < <
u s N N τ τ  , term (a) is positive. Then if  , (3.10) is positive and it will 
be optimal to tax capital as high-skilled workers are a stronger substitute for capital than unskilled 




k N N τ τ ˆ ˆ >
* < 1 ( )
u s N N τ τ ˆ ˆ 0 > >  and  then it will be optimal to subsidize 




k N N τ τ ˆ ˆ >
Proposition 4:  Let λ
* denote the value for λ that satisfies (3.7), the first order conditions in the absence of capital 
taxation.  Then with capital taxation we have: 
a) If  λ
* = 1( ) 0 ˆ ˆ < =
u s N N τ τ  then if  sk uk η η < = > ) ( , τk > (=) < 0. 
b) If  λ
* > 1( ) 0 ˆ ˆ < <




k N N τ τ ˆ ˆ > k > 0. 
c) If  λ
* < 1( ) 0 ˆ ˆ < <




k N N τ τ ˆ ˆ > k < 0. 
  While we would expect the income tax rate to be higher or lower than the rate when there is 
no capital taxation depending on whether the tax on capital is positive or negatives, intuitive state-
ments about the level of public service, relative to the efficient level or the level in the absence of in-
come taxation, are difficult.  For this reason, statements about the level of welfare are also difficult 
to make.  To provide some indication of how the opportunity to tax capital affects public service 
provision, utility of the two groups, and overall welfare, I modify the general equilibrium simulations 
reported in Table 3 to allow regions to tax capital as well as income. 
 In  Tables 4a – 4c, the results of these simulations with capital taxation are presented. The 
                                                      
3Recall that land is a fourth factor of production meaning that  us su uu ss η η η η = = , does not necessarily imply that 
sk uk η η = .    
 
  24parameterization is identical to the earlier simulations reported in Table 3 except now the cross price 
elasticities between labor and capital are non-zero.  I consider four alternative sets of values for 
these cross-price elasticities (ηsk=.5, ηuk=0; ηsk=-.5, ηuk=0; ηsk=0,ηuk=.5; ηsk=0, ηuk=-.5). The three tables 
differ in the taste parameters for the public service with Table 4a having equal valuations of the pub-
lic service for the two groups (a
s=a
u =.2), Table 4b reports the results for when only the skilled wor-
kers value the public service (a
s=.4; a
u =0) and Table 4c reports when only unskilled workers value the 
public service (a
s=0; a
u =.4).  In addition to varying the taste parameters and the elasticity of substitu-
tion between the two types of labor and capital, I also ran simulations with different degrees of mo-
bility for the two groups as I did in the simulations with no capital taxation. 
  Perhaps the most interesting results from these simulations is the sign and magnitude of the 
tax on capital.  Capital is positively taxed when skilled labor and capital are substitutes (column (a) of 
Tables 4a- 4c) except when unskilled labor is much more mobile than skilled labor (γs = 0.5; γu = 0) in 
which case it subsidized.  When unskilled labor is a complement with capital (column (d)) it is always 
taxed regardless of the relative mobility of the two types of labor.  As expected, capital is subsidized 
whenever skilled labor is a complement with capital (column (b)) and when unskilled labor is a com-
plement with it, though not when skilled labor is relatively more mobile (column (c)). 
  Public service provision with capital taxation exceeds that when only the income tax is used 
when the tax on capital is positive though it is not necessarily the case that it exceeds the efficient 
level of the public service (g = .20).  When the tax on capital is negative, the level of public service is 
below the level provided in the absence of capital taxation.   
  Relative total welfare is quite close to that found with only the income tax in all cases.  How-
ever, utility for both skilled and unskilled workers is higher with capital taxation when the tax on 
capital is positive and lower when the tax is negative.  That welfare can be quite similar in both cases 
and utility quite different in some cases is explained by the impact of capital taxation on the return 
  25to capital owners.  If the tax on capital is positive, the return is lower; a negative tax increases the 
return to capital owners. 
  The results of these simulations confirm that the sign and magnitude of any tax on capital 
imposed by regions depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor and cap-
ital and, to a less extent, the relative mobility of the two types of labor. The tax on capital appears to 
have little effect on overall welfare, though the impact on the level of public service, the welfare of 
the workers, and the returns to capital owners are directly related to whether capital is taxed or sub-
sidized which, as mentioned, depends on the relationships of the two types of labor with capital. 
4. Conclusion 
  There has been extensive literature addressing the issue of tax competition, with the focus 
on competition for mobile capital, physical or financial. Most, though not all, studies have assumed 
immobile labor. Because labor is immobile, the cost of public services provided to residents is not 
influenced by changes in capital, the tax base. Those studies that do assume mobile labor such as 
Brueckner (1999) or Wilson (1991) or Hoyt (1991, 1992) generally either have identical labor or capi-
tal taxation, a source of taxation not directly linked to the population. Typically these studies have 
public service costs proportionate to the population as well. In these cases, population movements 
do not have direct budgetary impacts in the sense that changes in population will either not directly 
affect revenues or affect revenues and costs equally. An exception is Hoyt (1993) in which the use of 
land taxation will lead to population (and associated housing capital) movements to generate fiscal 
deficits. Here we obtain distinctly different results from traditional tax competition results because 
we assume movements in the tax base affect the cost of providing public services. Then given 
limited tax instruments and different wage rates, movements by one group affect net revenue 
differently than another group. In fact, the results of traditional models of tax competition such as 
those introduced by Wilson (1986), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), can be reinterpreted in the 
  26context of our model. With capital mobile but generating no costs and labor immobile and 
consuming the public service, our model would predict underprovision of the service to the input 
that generates a fiscal deficit, labor. Our results on the overprovision of public services to the skilled 
workers is consistent with the result in Keen and Marchand (1997) that there is an inefficiently high 
mix of public inputs in production relative to public services consumed by residents. In the context 
of our model capital generates a fiscal surplus as the cost of providing the public input is 
independent of the amount of capital. Therefore, our model would offer the same prediction. 
  Somewhat in contrast to Keen and Marchand (1997) and Huber (1999), complementariness 
or substitutability in production, in our case between the two types of labor and in their models be-
tween capital and labor, has a second order influence on policies. Distortions in public services are 
only obtained in our model when there are fiscal imbalances between the two groups and differences 
in the tastes for the public services. If there are no fiscal imbalances, regional provision is efficient – 
the distortions arising from the income tax with inelastic labor are due to labor mobility. In contrast, 
in both Keen and Marchand (1997) and Huber (1999), labor is elastically supplied. Then even with 
centralized government provision, the efficacy of taxing labor and by how much relative capital will 
depend on the relationship between them. 
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A.1  Proof of Proposition 2 
 
To prove part (a) of the proposition rewrite (2.14a) when τk = 0 as 
 
  () ( ) τ τ λ τ λ N F w Nw ˆ ˆ 1 1 − = + −                         (A.1.1a) 
 
and (2.14b) as  
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) g g N F w w N MRS N ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 λ τ λ − = − − − −                                (A.1.1b) 
 
Then substituting  τ w
w
MRS ˆ −  for  and  g w ˆ τ N
w
MRS ˆ − for  gives  g N ˆ
 
  () ( ) () () 0 ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 = − + − − − τ τ λ τ λ N F
w
MRS
w MRS N MRS N       (A.1.2) 
which can be expressed as  
 
() () ( ) () () () [] () ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 ˆ ˆ 1 1
1 ˆ 1 ˆ 1 1 1
1
1 = + + − = − + − + − − − τ τ τ τ λ τ λ λ τ λ N F w Nw
w
N F MRS w MRS Nw
w
MRS N   (A.1.2’) 
 
Then as the term on the right side must equal zero for (2.12a) to be satisfied when τk = 0, the left must also equal zero. 
This will occur when MRS = 1. 
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A.2  Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Part a) of the proposition follows immediately and need not be discussed further.  In part b) if, as is assumed, λ* = 1, 
then (3.7b) reduces to  
 
  ( ) ( )( )









u s u u s s N N g w N N N MRS N MRS N − − − = + − + τ λ      (A.2.1) 
If  then it follows that   0 ˆ ˆ < =
u s N N τ τ
 





u s w w N N τ τ τ τ η η η η
 
where 






η γ η γ γ τ −
+ − =
− A
w su u uu u s
s   a n d           (A.2.3a) 






η γ η γ γ τ −
+ − =
− A
w us s ss s u
u         (A.2.3b) 
and 
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g       (A.2.4b) 
Then substituting (A.2.3) for the gradients into (A.2.4) gives 
 
() () ( ) []



















− − − −
+ − − − −
= −
−
τ η γ γ η η η γ η η




ss s u su uu su u us ss
b
us s su uu uu u s us ss
a u s      (A.2.5) 
From inspection it is apparent that for (A.2.5) to be equal to zero, term (a) must be negative and term (b) must be 
positive.  Then the public service we have   








g w w N N ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ η η η η − − − = − )
 
and substituting for the wage gradients with respect to the public service (A.2.4) into (A.2.6) gives 
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g    (A.2.7) 
Then given that term (a) and term (b) in (A.2.7) are of equal magnitude but opposite signs,  =0 if  u
g
s









= making the right side of (A.2.1) equal to 0 so  ( ) 0 = + − +













) (< >  making  ( ) 0 ) (> < + − +
u s u u s s N N MRS N MRS N  as   ( ) { }




g N N sign ˆ ˆ − − . 
 
  29In part (c),  . Then from (3.7.a) λ 0 ˆ ˆ < <
u s N N τ τ
* > 1.  With λ
* > 1in (3.7.b) the term 





s s w w N w w N ˆ 1 ˆ 1 1 τ τ λ − + − −  is positive.  Then an unambiguous sign for the right side of (3.7b) is only ob-













<  as in this case term (b) of (3.7b) will also be positive.  An analogous 
argument applies for part (d) of the proposition. 
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Table 2:  Capital Taxes as a Share of Fixed Costs, Alternative Parameterizations 
 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f) 
γ   100  5  0.5  100  5  0.5   
  1 , 1 − = − = kk ll η η  
kl η   0  (1) 
F K k τ   0.258 0.231 0.160 
kl η   0.5  (2) 
F K k τ   0.516 0.458 0.315 
kl η   -0.5  (3) 
F K k τ   -0.204 -0.169 -0.098   
    5 . 1 , 5 . 0 − = − = kk ll η η   5 . 0 , 5 . 1 − = − = kk ll η η  
kl η   0 0  (4) 
F K k τ   .100 .094 .074 .529 .470 .323 
kl η   0.5 0.5  (5) 
F K k τ   .339 .313 .240 .784 .692 .472 
kl η   -0.5 -0.5  (6) 
F K k τ   -.267 -.244 -.171 -.027 -.021 -.011 
    75 . 1 0 , 25 . − = − = kk ll η η   25 . 0 , 75 . 1 − = − = kk ll η η  
kl η   0 0  (7) 
F K k τ   .045 .043 .038 .734 .676 .510 
kl η   0.5 0.5  (8) 
F K k τ   .271 .258 .216 .966 .875 .635 
kl η   -0.5 -0.5  (9) 
F K k τ   -.289 -.272 -.217 .194 .153 .080 Table 3:  Income Taxation with Heterogeneous Workers 
Tastes for Public Service 
  (a)          (b) (c) (d) (e)
    a
s, a
u 0.2, 0.2  0.4, 0  0, 0.4  0.3, 0.1  0.25, 0.15 
Mobility 
                                (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
γ
s 3                              5.5 0.5 3 5.5 0.5 3 5.5 0.5 3 5.5 0.5 3 5.5 0.5
γ
u 3                              0.5 5.5 3 0.5 5.5 3 0.5 5.5 3 0.5 5.5 3 0.5 5.5
Decentralized Policies 
τ  0.1314        0.1321 0.1316 0.1373 0.1359 0.1369 0.1261 0.1285 0.1269 0.1343 0.1340 0.1342 0.1329 0.1330 0.1329
g  0.1972        0.1981 0.1975 0.2060 0.2039 0.2053 0.1892 0.1927 0.1903 0.2015 0.2010 0.2013 0.1993 0.1995 0.1994
λ  1      1.0119 0.9881 1.0000 1.0123 0.9876 1.0000 1.0116  0.9886 1.0000 1.0121 0.9879 1.0000 1.0120 0.9880
Decentralized Polices relative to Centralized Policies 














        1.0007 1.0004 1.0006 1.0035 1.0023 1.0031 1.0083 1.0056 1.0075 1.0002 1.0001 1.0002 1.00004 1.00003 1.00004















0.9982      0.9988 0.9984 0.9954 0.9970 0.9959 0.9325 0.9550 0.9398 0.9997 0.9998 0.9997 0.99990 0.99994 0.99991









  1.0000      1.0000 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
Gradients 




g N N ˆ ˆ   0.5            1.2692 0.1970 --- --- --- 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 1.5000 3.8077 0.5909 0.833 2.115 0.328
 
  32Table 4a:  Income and Capital Taxation with Heterogeneous Workers, Equal Demand for Public Service 
    a
s , a
u 0.2, 0.2 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
ηsk, ηuk 0.5, 0  -0.5, 0  0, 0.5  0, -0.5 
υs, υu 3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5 3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5  3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5 3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5 
Capital Tax Rate (τk)                          0.0145 0.0311 -0.0132 -0.0684 -0.0255 -0.0842 -0.0171 0.0116 -0.0430 0.0381 0.0458 0.0143
λ                  0.9889  0.9885  0.9944  1.0182  1.0166 1.0090 1.0135 1.0051 1.0174 0.9903 0.9958 0.9873
g
** 0.1998                        0.2031 0.1957 0.1919 0.1972 0.1904 0.1939 0.1995 0.1900 0.1999 0.2014 0.1980










  0.9399                        0.8680 1.0582 1.3205 1.1238 1.3906 1.0705 0.9486 1.1796 0.8203 0.7854 0.9306










   1.0136                        1.0251 0.9912 0.9734 0.9953 0.9640 0.9837 1.0072 0.9620 1.0137 1.0167 1.0029















  1.0131                        1.0282 0.9879 0.9365 0.9762 0.9220 0.9846 1.0106 0.9610 1.0354 1.0425 1.0133















  1.0195                        1.0412 0.9826 0.9126 0.9682 0.8920 0.9769 1.0151 0.9423 1.0485 1.0582 1.0178










 1.00001  0.99999  0.99998  0.99993  0.99999                0.99989 0.99996 1.00000 0.99988 1.00001 1.00000 1.00000
s
k Nτ ˆ   0.3696                        0.4103 0.1689 -0.4025 -0.4341 -0.1820 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
u
k Nτ ˆ   0.0000                        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3815 0.1648 0.4421 -0.3612 -0.1594 -0.4171
 
  33Table 4b:  Income and Capital Taxation with Heterogeneous Workers, Demand for Public Service only by Skilled Workers 
 
    a
s , a
u 0.4, 0 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
ηsk, ηuk 0.5, 0  -0.5, 0  0, 0.5  0, -0.5 
υs, υu 3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5 3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5  3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5 3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5 
Capital Tax Rate (τk)                          0.0151 0.0319 -0.0139 -0.0731 -0.0262 -0.0896 -0.0179 0.0120 -0.0450 0.0394 0.0468 0.0145
λ                  0.9884  0.9882  0.9942  1.0195  1.0171 1.0097 1.0141 1.0052 1.0183 0.9900 0.9957 0.9869
g** 0.2081                        0.2083 0.2041 0.2040 0.2038 0.2020 0.2033 0.2051 0.1994 0.2069 0.2060 0.2052










 0.9372                        0.8651 1.0616 1.3455 1.1279 1.4201 1.0742 0.9471 1.1909 0.8132 0.7804 0.9290










   1.0105                        1.0216 0.9941 0.9905 0.9994 0.9838 0.9872 1.0058 0.9715 1.0047 1.0101 0.9997















  1.0196                        1.0414 0.9824 0.9097 0.9679 0.8888 0.9767 1.0153 0.9416 1.0486 1.0584 1.0177















  1.0100                        1.0212 0.9902 0.9450 0.9799 0.9334 0.9882 1.0083 0.9697 1.0297 1.0346 1.0113










 0.99996  0.99993  1.00001  1.00002  1.00000                1.00003 1.00003 0.99999 1.00003 0.99998 0.99997 1.00000
s
k Nτ ˆ   0.3694                        0.4100 0.1690 -0.4046 -0.4345 -0.1831 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
u
k Nτ ˆ   0.0000                        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3818 0.1647 0.4430 -0.3608 -0.1592 -0.4170
 
  34Table 4c:  Income and Capital Taxation with Heterogeneous Workers, Demand for Public Service only by Unskilled Workers 
 
    a
s , a
u 0, 0.4 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
ηsk, ηuk 0.5, 0  -0.5, 0  0, 0.5  0, -0.5 
υs, υu 3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5 3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5  3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5 3, 3  5.5, 0.5 0.5, 5.5 
Capital Tax Rate (τk)    0.0140  0.0304 -0.0127 -0.0644 -0.0247 -0.0796 -0.0164 0.0113 -0.0411 0.0370 0.0449 0.0140 
λ    0.9893  0.9887 0.9946 1.0171 1.0160 1.0084 1.0129 1.0050 1.0165 0.9906 0.9959 0.9878 
g** 0.1923    0.1982 0.1881 0.1814 0.1911 0.1803 0.1855 0.1943 0.1815 0.1933 0.1971 0.1914 










 0.9423    0.8707 1.0553 1.2996 1.1200 1.3659 1.0672 0.9499 1.1699 0.8266 0.7901 0.9322 










   1.0164  1.0285 0.9886 0.9591 0.9916 0.9474 0.9805 1.0086 0.9538 1.0220 1.0229 1.0058 















  1.0083    1.0191 0.9920 0.9568 0.9823 0.9468 0.9903 1.0074 0.9753 1.0250 1.0309 1.0099 















  1.0662    1.1308 0.9447 0.7379 0.9118 0.6752 0.9214 1.0463 0.8068 1.1470 1.1692 1.0522 










 1.00008  1.00007 0.99994 0.99969 0.99997 0.99960 0.99987 1.00003 0.99966 1.00010 1.00006 1.00003 
s
k Nτ ˆ  0.3698  0.4106 0.1688 -0.4008 -0.4338 -0.1811 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
u
k Nτ ˆ  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3812 0.1648 0.4412 -0.3616 -0.1595 -0.4172 
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